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Abstract
Federated Learning (FL) allows multiple participants to col-
laboratively train machine learning models by keeping their
datasets local and exchanging model updates. Recent work
has highlighted weaknesses related to robustness and privacy
in FL, including backdoor, membership and property inference
attacks. In this paper, we investigate whether and how Dif-
ferential Privacy (DP) can be used to defend against attacks
targeting both robustness and privacy in FL. To this end, we
present a first-of-its-kind experimental evaluation of Local and
Central Differential Privacy (LDP/CDP), assessing their feasi-
bility and effectiveness.
We show that both LDP and CDP do defend against back-
door attacks, with varying levels of protection and utility, and
overall more effectively than non-DP defenses. They also miti-
gate white-box membership inference attacks, which our work
is the first to show. Neither, however, defend against property
inference attacks, prompting the need for further research in
this space. Overall, our work also provides a re-usable mea-
surement framework to quantify the trade-offs between robust-
ness/privacy and utility in differentially private FL.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) models are increasingly deployed in
a wide range of user-facing applications, as the larger avail-
ability of contextual data allows models to become more and
more accurate and personalized. However, this data is often
very sensitive, thus creating conflicts between the need to pro-
tect user privacy and that for training data.
Federated Learning (FL) [64] is emerging as a promising
compromise between the conventional centralized approach to
ML (where training data is pooled at a central server) and the
alternative of only training local models, client-side. The main
intuition is to let multiple clients (“participants”) collaborate in
solving an ML problem [53]. Data is kept on the user’s device,
as participants only exchange model parameters with a central
server, which aggregates and returns an updated model. To-
day, FL is used in production for different tasks, e.g., Google’s
predictive keyboard [37, 103], emoji prediction [82], voice as-
sistant personalization [6], medical applications [10, 87].
Previous work has also highlighted robustness and pri-
vacy weaknesses in FL, such as poisoning and inference at-
tacks [53]. In the former, an adversary tries to reduce the ac-
curacy of the model or make it misbehave on specific inputs;
in particular, backdoor attacks have been presented against FL
where a malicious client injects a backdoor task into the fi-
nal model [4]. In the latter, the adversary tries to infer mem-
bership [70] (i.e., learning if a data point is part of a victim’s
training set), or properties [67] of the training data.
Aiming to mitigate backdoor attacks, Sun et al. [93] intro-
duce two defenses, namely bounding the norm of gradient up-
dates and adding Gaussian noise—the main intuition being re-
ducing the effect of poisonous data on the global model. As for
privacy, participants can use homomorphic encryption so that
that the server can only decrypt the aggregates [9]; however,
this does not prevent leakage from the aggregates [67]. The
established framework to define privacy-preserving functions
that are free from adversarial inferences is Differential Privacy
(DP) [26]. Differentially private techniques protect privacy of
individual data subjects by adding random noise. In the con-
text of FL, one can use one of two DP “flavors”: 1) Local
Differential Privacy (LDP) [78], where each participant adds
noise before sending model updates to the server; 2) Central
Differential Privacy (CDP) [33, 65], where participants send
model updates without adding any noise, and the server ap-
plies a DP aggregation algorithm.
Available defenses only mitigate either backdoor or infer-
ence attacks in FL. That is, we do not know what mechanism,
and how, to deploy for protecting against both. However, we
argue that DP can be used for this purpose. Our intuition is
that CDP should limit the information learned about a specific
participant, while LDP does so for records in a participant’s
dataset; in both cases, the impact of poisonous data should
be reduced. Similar observations have been recently explored
in [48, 62] for deep neural networks, although not in FL.
With this motivation in mind, we introduce the first analyt-
ical framework to empirically understand the effectiveness of
LDP and CDP in protecting FL. More specifically, we aim to
understand which mechanism is suitable to protect federated
models from both backdoor and inference attacks, while main-
taining acceptable utility. In the process, we need to address
a few challenges. First, there is no straightforward analytical
way to determine the effect of LDP/CDP on utility. Second,
we do not know how to compare the protection they yield, as
they are not meant to guarantee robustness, and even for pri-
vacy, their definitions capture slightly different notions.
Technical Roadmap. Our work unfolds along two main tasks:
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1) assessing whether/how we can use DP to mitigate backdoor
attacks in FL, 2) building an experimental framework geared
to test the real-world effectiveness of defenses against robust-
ness, and inference attacks in FL. For the former, we run ex-
periments on the EMNIST dataset, which includes handwrit-
ten digits. We consider two different FL settings with varying
numbers of participants and attackers. Next, we experiment
with white-box1 membership inference attacks [70] on the CI-
FAR100 dataset (different classes of images) and Purchase100
(records of purchases). We consider both active and passive
attacks, run from both server and participant side. Finally, we
run property inference attacks [67] for a gender classification
task on the LFW faces dataset; the attack consists in inferring
uncorrelated properties, such as race, from a target client.
Main Findings. We show that both LDP and CDP do defend
against backdoor attacks, with varying levels of protection and
utility. For instance, in a setting with 2,400 participants, with
30 of them selected at every round, and 1 attacker perform-
ing a backdoor attack, LDP and CDP (with  = 3) reduce
the accuracy of the attack from 88% to 10% and 6%, respec-
tively. By comparison, using non-DP defenses from [93], at-
tack accuracy only goes down to 37% with norm bounding
and 16% with weak DP. Moreover, LDP and CDP also pro-
tect privacy, as they can defend against white-box membership
inference [70]. For example, with 4 participants (the same set-
ting as [70]), LDP ( = 8.6) and CDP ( = 5.8) reduce the
accuracy of an active attack from 76% to 56% and 48%, re-
spectively, on the CIFAR100 dataset, and from 69% to 55%
and 56% on the Purchase100 dataset.
As for property inference attacks, LDP is ineffective, espe-
cially when the target participant has many data points with
the desired property; this is not surprising as LDP only pro-
vides record-level privacy. Although CDP can in theory de-
fend against the attack, it does so with a big loss in utility.
For example, with 10 participants on the LFW dataset, CDP
only yields a 57% accuracy for the main task when  = 4.7;
increasing  to 8.1, main task accuracy reaches 83%, but the
accuracy of the property inference only goes down from 87%
to 85%.2 This prompts the need for further research toward
better mitigation against property inference attacks in FL.
Contributions. The main contributions of our work include:
• We are the first to propose the use of DP to mitigate back-
door attacks against FL, and show that both LDP and
CDP can successfully do so. In fact, they can defend bet-
ter than the state of the art [93], additionally protecting
privacy as well, although at the cost of slightly decreas-
ing the utility.
• We are the first to show that both LDP and CDP can de-
fend against white-box membership inference attacks in
FL [70] without destroying utility.
1White-box refers to the attacker having complete knowledge of the system’s
parameters, except for the participants’ datasets.
2On a side note, unlike what suggested in [67], our models do converge when
increasing the privacy budget to, e.g.,  = 8.1 with CDP for 10 participants
on the LFW dataset, although this is not enough to thwart the attack.
Figure 1: Training process in Federated Learning (round r).
• We provide a re-usable measurement framework to em-
pirically quantify the trade-offs between robustness/pri-
vacy and utility yielded by LDP and CDP in FL. (Source
code is available upon request.)
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review Federated Learning (FL) and Differ-
ential Privacy (DP), then, we introduce robustness and privacy
attacks in FL. Readers who are already familiar with these con-
cepts can skip this section without loss of continuity.
2.1 Federated Learning (FL)
FL is a distributed/collaborative learning setting to train ma-
chine learning models [64]. It involves N participants (or
clients), each holding their own private dataset, and a central
server (or aggregator). Unlike in the traditional centralized ap-
proach, data is not pooled at a central server; whereas, partic-
ipants train models locally and exchange updated parameters
with the server, which aggregates them and returns the result
to the participants.
FL involves multiple rounds. In round 0, the server gen-
erates a model with random parameters θ0, which is sent to
all participants. Then, at each round r, K out of N partic-
ipants are selected at random; each participant i locally com-
putes training gradients according to their local datasetDi, and
sends the updated parameters to the server. The latter com-
putes the global parameters θr = ΣKi=1θi/K and sends them
to allN participants for the next round. After a certain number
of rounds (R), the model is finalized with parameters θR. The
typical FL training process is also described in Fig. 1.
There are different privacy-enhancing techniques used in
FL. Homomorphic Encryption (HE) can be used to encrypt
participants’ parameters, in such a way that the server can only
decrypt the aggregates [9, 19, 38]. However, this is resource
intensive and does not mitigate inference attacks over the out-
put of the aggregation, as global parameters can still leak in-
formation. Another approach is to use differentially private
techniques, which we review next.
2.2 Differential Privacy (DP)
Differential Privacy provides statistical guarantees against
the information an adversary can infer through the output of
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Algorithm 1 Central Differential Privacy in Federated Learning
1: procedure MAIN . Executed at the server side
2: Initialize: model θ0, Moment Accountant(, N) . N is number of all participants
3: for each round r = 1, 2, ... do
4: Cr ← randomly select participants with probability q
5: pr ←Moment Accountant.get privacy spent() . It returns the spect privacy budget for current round
6: if pr > T then . If spent privacy budget is greater than threshold, return current model
7: return θr
8: for each participant k ∈ Cr do
9: ∆r+1k ←PARTICIPANT UPDATE(k, θr) . This is done in parallel
10: S ← bound
11: z ← noisescale
12: σ ← zS/q
13: θr+1 ← θr + ΣCri=1∆r+1i /Cr +N(0, Iσ2)
14: Moment Accountant.accumulate spent privacy(z)
15: function PARTICIPANT UPDATE(k, θr)
16: θ ← θr
17: for each local epoch i from 1 to E do
18: for batch b ∈ B do
19: θ ← θ − η∇L(w; b)
20: ∆← θ − θr
21: θ ← θ0 + ∆ min(1, S‖∆‖2 )
22: return θ − θr . This one is already clipped
a randomized algorithm. That is, it provides an unconditional
upper bound on the influence of a single individual on the out-
put of the algorithm by adding noise. The formal definition of
DP is given next [26].
Definition 1 A randomized mechanism M provides (, δ)-
differential privacy if for any two neighboring databases, D1
and D2, that differ in only a single record, and for all possible
outputs S ⊆ Range(A):
P [M(D1 ∈ A)] ≤ eP [M(D2 ∈ A)] + δ (1)
The  parameter (aka privacy budget) is a metric of privacy
loss. It also controls the privacy-utility trade-off, i.e., lower 
values indicate higher levels of privacy, but likely reduce utility
too. The δ parameter accounts for a (small) probability on
which the upper bound  does not hold. The amount of noise
needed to achieve DP is proportional to the sensitivity of the
output; this measures the maximum change in the output due
to the inclusion or removal of a single record.
In ML, DP is used to learn a distribution of a dataset while
providing privacy for individual records [50]. Differentially
Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD) [1] and Private
Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles (PATE) [74] are two dif-
ferent approaches to privacy-preserving ML (in this paper, we
use the former). DP-SGD [1] uses a noisy version of stochas-
tic gradient descent to find differentially private minima for
the optimization problem. This is done by bounding the gra-
dients, and then adding noise with the help of the “moments
accountant” technique in order to keep track of the spent pri-
vacy budget. Whereas, PATE [74] provides privacy for training
data using a student-teacher architecture.
2.3 DP in FL
As mentioned, in the context of FL, one can use one of two
flavors of DP; namely, central and local [33, 65, 78].
Central Differential Privacy (CDP). With CDP, the FL ag-
gregation function is perturbed by the server, and this pro-
vides participant-level DP. This guarantees that the output of
the aggregation function is indistinguishable (with probabil-
ity bounded by ) to whether or not a given participant is part
of the training process. In this setting, participants need to
trust the server: 1) with their model updates, and 2) to cor-
rectly perform perturbation by adding noise, etc. In this pa-
per, we implement the CDP approach for FL discussed in [65]
and [33], which is illustrated in Algorithm 1. The server clips
the l2 norm of participants’ updates, then, it aggregates the
clipped updates and adds Gaussian noise to the aggregate. This
prevents overfitting to any participant’s updates. To track the
privacy budget spent, the moments accountant technique from
in [1] can be used.
Local Differential Privacy (LDP). With LDP, the noise ad-
dition required for DP is performed locally by each individual
participants. Each participant runs a random perturbation al-
gorithm M and sends the results to the server. The perturbed
result is guaranteed to protect individual’s data according as
per the  value. This is formally defined next [25].
Definition 2 Let X be a set of possible values and Y the set
of noisy values. A mechanism M is (, δ)-locally differentially
private (-LDP) if for all x1, x2 ∈ X and for all y ∈ Y :
P [M(x) = y] ≤ eP [M(x′) = y] + δ (2)
In the context of FL, LDP can be implemented in two differ-
ent ways: 1) One can train the local model on the participants
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dataset and, before sending the parameters to the server, apply
perturbations to the updates. 2) Participants can use differen-
tially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) [1] to train
the model on their datasets. This way, the moments accoun-
tant technique can be used to keep track of the privacy budget.
Overall, the latter approach provides better privacy, thus, in
this paper we implement LDP by using DP-SGD. Algorithm 2
shows how DP-SGD in LDP works.
2.4 Attacks against FL
Prior work has showed that model updates from participants
in FL may leak private information and that adversarial partic-
ipants can affect the robustness of the model; see Section 5 for
a comprehensive review. In this paper, we focus on two ad-
versarial goals: 1) making the final model behave differently
than intended (i.e., Poisoning Attacks), and 2) extracting pri-
vate information from benign clients (i.e., Inference Attacks
like Membership and Property Inference).
Poisoning Attacks. These can be divided in random attacks,
where the attacker aims to decrease the accuracy of the final
model, and targeted ones, where the goal is to make the model
output a target label pre-defined by the attacker [44]. In the
context of FL, participants (and not the server) are potential
adversaries. Random attacks are easier to identify as the server
could check if the accuracy is below a threshold or not.
Poisoning attacks can be performed on data or models. In
the former, the attacker adds examples to the training set to
modify the final model’s behavior. In the latter, she poisons the
local model before sending it to the server. In both cases, the
goal is to make the final model mis-classify a set of predefined
inputs. Remind that, in FL, data is never sent to the server.
Therefore, anything that can be achieved with poisonous data
is also feasible by poisoning the model [27, 61].
In this paper, we focus on a particular kind of poisoning at-
tacks, known as Backdoor Attacks, where a malicious client
injects a backdoor task into the final model. More specifically,
following [4, 5, 93], we consider targeted model poisoning at-
tacks and refer to them as backdoor attacks. The details of the
attack we implement are presented in Section 3.1.
Membership Inference Attacks. In ML, a membership infer-
ence attack aims to determine if a specific data point was used
to train a model [39, 89]. There are new challenges in FL in-
troduced by such attacks; for instance, the adversary can infer
if a given sample belongs to the training set of a particular par-
ticipant or any participant in the setting [67, 70]. Moreover, it
might be more difficult for the adversary to infer membership
through overfitting. In this paper, we focus on white-box MIA
attacks introduced by Nasr et al. [70]. Overall, the idea is to
compensate the gradient direction, so that it reveals that the
data sample is in the training set. We review the attack in more
details in Section 4.1.
Property Inference Attacks. The main goal is to recognize
patterns within a model to reveal some property which the
model producer might not want to disclose. We focus on the
attacks introduced by Melis et al. [67], who show how to in-
fer properties of training data that are uncorrelated with the
features that characterize the classes of the model; see Sec-
tion 4.1.
3 Defending Against Backdoor Attacks
in FL
In this section, we experiment with LDP and CDP against
backdoor attacks, comparing our results with state-of-the-art
defenses in terms of both robustness and utility.
3.1 Attack
As discussed earlier, poisoning attacks in FL aim to modify
the behavior of the aggregated model in an unwanted way. Our
main focus is on backdoor attacks, where the attacker modi-
fies her training dataset to introduce backdoors into the global
model. Backdoor attacks in FL are relatively straightforward
to implement and rather effective [4]; it is not easy to defend
against them, as the server cannot access participants’ data as
that would violate one of the main principles of FL.
The main intuition is to rely on a new model-replacement
methodology: in round r, the attacker attempts to introduce a
backdoor and replaces the aggregated model by a backdoored
one θ∗, by sending the following update to the server:
θattackerr =
ΣKi=1ni
ηnattacker
· (θ∗ − θr) (3)
where ni is number of data points at participant i and η is the
server learning rate. Then, the aggregation would yield:
θr = θ∗ + η
ΣK−1i=1 niθi
ΣKi=1ni
(4)
If we assume the training process is in its last rounds, then
the aggregated model is going to converge; therefore, model
updates from non-attacker participants are small and we would
have θr ' θ∗.
3.2 Defenses
One possible approach to defend against poisoning attacks
is to use byzantine-resilient aggregation frameworks, e.g.,
Krum [8] or coordinate-wise median [107]. However, as
showed in [5], these are not effective in the FL setting. Over-
all, FL is vulnerable to backdoor attacks as it is difficult to
control the local model submitted by malicious participants.
Defenses that require access to the training data are not appli-
cable as that would violate privacy of the participants, defeat-
ing one of the main reasons to use FL in the first place. In fact,
even defenses that do not require training data, e.g., DeepIn-
spect [14], require inverting the model in order to extract the
training data, thus violating the privacy-preserving goal of FL.
Similarly, if a model is trained over encrypted data, e.g., us-
ing CryptoNet [34] or SecureML [68], the server cannot detect
anomalies in participant’s updates.
Sun et al. [93] show that the performance of backdoor at-
tacks in FL ultimately depends on the fraction of adversaries
and the complexity of the task. They provide two defenses:
1) Norm Bounding and 2) Weak Differential Privacy. Even
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Algorithm 2 Local Differential Privacy in Federated Learning
1: procedure MAIN . Executed at the server side
2: Initialize: model θ0
3: for each round r = 1, 2, ... do
4: Kr ← randomly select K participants
5: for each participant k ∈ Kr do
6: θkr ← DP-SGD . This is done in parallel
7: θr ← ΣKri=1
nk
n
θkr . n
k is the size of dataset at participant k
8: function DP-SGD(Clipping norm C, dataset D,sampling probability p
noise magnitude σ, learning rate η, Iterations E, loss function L(θ(x), y))
9: Initialize θ0
10: for each local epoch i from 1 to E do
11: for (x, y) ∈ random batch from dataset D with probability p do
12: gi = ∇θL(θi; (x, y))
13: Temp =
1
pD
Σi∈batchgimin(1,
C
‖gi‖2 ) +N(0, σ
2I)
14: θi+1 = θi − η(Temp)
15: return θE
though they are not meant to protect against inference attacks
(but only backdoor), we also explain why they provide little
protection against inference attacks.
Norm Bounding. If model updates received from attackers are
over some threshold, then the server can simply ignore those
participants. However, if the attacker is aware of the thresh-
old, it can return updates within that threshold. Sun et al. [93]
assume that the adversary has this strong advantage and ap-
ply norm bounding as a defense, guaranteeing that the norm
of each model update is small. If we assume that the updates’
threshold is T , then the server can ensure that norm of partici-
pants’ updates are within the threshold:
∆r+1=
k∑
i=1
∆r+1k
max
(
1,
‖∆r+1k ‖2
T
) (5)
In their experiments, Sun et al. [93] show that this defense mit-
igates backdoor attacks, meaning that it provides robustness
for participants. For instance, in an FL setting with 3,383 par-
ticipants using the EMNIST dataset, with 30 clients per round
and one of them performing the backdoor attack, they show
that selecting 3 as the norm bound almost mitigates the attack
while not affecting the utility (attack accuracy reduces from
89% to 5%). However, it does not provide privacy for partic-
ipants as participants’ updates are sent in the clear, and thus
can leak information about training data.
Weak Differential Privacy. At every round, the server not
only applies norm bounding, but also adds Gaussian noise.
This defense does not keep the privacy budget under control,
as it adds noise at every round ignoring the noise added in
previous rounds. In DP, the concept of composability ensures
that the joint distribution of the outputs of differentially pri-
vate mechanisms satisfies DP [66]. However, because of se-
quential composition, if there are n independent mechanisms,
M1, ..., Mn, with 1, ..., n respectively, then a function g of
those mechanisms g(M1, ...,Mn) is (
∑n
i=1 i)-differentially
private.
Therefore, if we assume that, at every round, the server ap-
plies an -differentially private mechanism on participants’ up-
dates, then this weak differential privacy solution results in
spending r ∗  privacy budget after r number of rounds. This
yields larger values of , and thus significantly less privacy for
participants. We do note, however, that Sun et al.’s goal is to
defend against backdoor attacks, not inference attacks.
3.3 Overview of the Experiments
In the rest of this section, we experiment with both LDP
and CDP mechanisms in FL, which can also protect privacy,
against backdoor attacks. We compare it with current defenses
from [93]. We do so vis-a`-vis different scenarios, applying:
1. CDP on all participants;
2. LDP on all participants (including attackers);
3. LDP on non-attackers, while attackers opt out;
4. Norm bounding as per [93].
5. Weak DP as per [93].
3.4 Experimental Setup
Dataset & Task. We use the same dataset, EMNIST, chosen
in [93] to ease comparisons. This dataset is a set of handwrit-
ten character digits derived from the NIST Special Database
19 and converted to a 28x28 pixel image format and dataset
structure that directly matches the MNIST dataset [21]. The
target model for this dataset is character recognition, with a
training set of 240,000 examples, and a test set of 40,000 ex-
amples. Since each digit is written by a different user with a
different writing style, the EMNIST dataset presents a kind of
non-i.i.d. behavior which is more realistic in an FL setting. We
use a five-layer convolution neural network with two convolu-
tion layers, one max-pooling layer, and two dense layers. All
experiments are implemented using PyTorch [77]; source code
is available upon request and will be made available along with
the final version of the paper. Note that our code is not spe-
cific to PyTorch and can be easily ported to other frameworks
that allow loss modification, i.e., using dynamic computational
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(a) Original (b) Backdoored
Figure 2: An image and its single-pixel backdoored version.
graphs, such as TensorFlow [2].
Attack Settings. We mount a single-pixel attack, as depicted
in Fig. 2. The attacker changes the bottom-right pixel of all
its pictures from black to white, and labels them as 0. We
compute both main task and backdoor accuracies; the latter is
measured as the fraction of the number of backdoored images
predicted as 0 over the number of all backdoored images.
We consider two setups for our experiments:
1. Setting 1: We reproduce the setting considered by Sun et
al. [93], in order to have a fair comparison.
2. Setting 2: We consider an increasing fraction of mali-
cious participants, aiming to show how effective defenses
are against varying numbers of attackers.
3.5 Setting 1: Reproducing Sun et al. [93]
We consider an FL setting with 2,400 participants, each hav-
ing 100 images. In each round, we select 30 clients, with one
of them being the attacker. We follow the same setup as [93].
Each client trains the model with their own local data for 5
epochs with batch size 20 and client learning rate 0.1. We use
a server learning rate of 1 and run the experiments for 300
rounds. Values are averaged over 5 runs.
Unconstrained Attack. Fig. 3a reports the results of our ex-
periments with an unconstrained attack with one attacker in
every round. The attacker performs a single-pixel attack on its
dataset, trains the model sent from server on it, and sends the
updated model back. This is done without any constraints en-
forced on the attacker from the server side. Results show that
the backdoor accuracy reaches around 88% after 300 rounds,
and does not affect utility as main task accuracy just is reduced
from 94% to 92%. In other words, the attack works quite well,
even with only one attacker in every round.
Norm Bounding. We then apply norm bounding. Fig. 3b
plots the results with norm bounds 3 and 5, showing that norm
bounds do not affect the main task accuracy (around 90%).
Also, setting the norm bound to 3, unsurprisingly, mitigates
the attack better than setting it to 5 (7% compared to 37%).
This confirms that this approach does defend against the at-
tack, with no significant effect on utility.
Weak DP. As discussed earlier, this involves using norm
bounding and then adding Gaussian noise. In Fig. 3c, we re-
port the results of our experiments, using norm bound 5, plus
Gaussian noise with variance σ = 0.025 added to each up-
date. This mitigates the attack better than just norm bounding,
e.g., with norm bound 5 the backdoor accuracy is reduced to
16%, without really affecting main task accuracy. However,
as noise is added on every round, the resulting  value is high,
thus, this does not provide reasonable privacy protection for
participants.
LDP and CDP. We then turn to LDP and CDP, aiming to 1)
assess their behavior against backdoor attacks, and 2) compare
how they perform compared to the above defenses. For LDP,
we follow Algorithm 2. Every client uses DP-SGD with  = 3
and δ = 10−5 to train the model on their data. Fig. 3d shows
that LDP provides significantly worse main task accuracy in
comparison to weak DP and norm bounding (62% vs 90%);
however, it provides better attack mitigation (10% vs 16%).
Finally, in Fig. 3e, we report the results of the experiments
using CDP, based on Algorithm 1, setting  = 3 and δ =
10−5. CDP mitigates the backdoor attack better, providing
better utility as well. More precisely, the attack’s accuracy
goes down to almost 6%, with main task accuracy at 86%.
3.6 Setting 2: Increasing Number of Attackers
Here we consider a total of 100 clients, each having 2,400
images. In each round, the server selects all clients (i.e., the
fraction of number of users to be selected is 1). We run our
experiments for 50 rounds and vary the number of attackers
from 10 to 90. The attacker performs the single-pixel attack.
Results values are averaged over 5 runs.
Unconstrained Attack. First, in Fig. 4a, we report the base-
line as to how the number of attackers affects utility and back-
door accuracies. As expected, increasing the number of attack-
ers improves backdoor accuracy and affects utility. However,
even with 90 attackers, utility decreases to only around 88%,
meaning that identifying backdoor attacks from a decrease in
utility is not a viable solution.
Norm bounding. We then apply norm bounding ; Fig. 4b plots
the results with norm bounds 5, showing that it does mitigate
the attack. However, comparing to Setting 1, utility is slightly
reduced. For instance, with 50 attackers, backdoor accuracy
is reduced from around 98% to around 47% and utility from
around 96% to 91%.
Weak DP. In Fig. 4c, we report the results of the experiments
using norm bound 5, plus Gaussian noise with variance σ =
0.025 added to each update. Compared to norm bounding, it
mitigates the attack better (42% vs 47% backdoor accuracy for
50 attackers), but utility is reduced further (down to 84%).
LDP. For LDP, we consider two scenarios, based on whether
or not the attackers follow the protocol and apply DP before
sharing model updates. Fig. 4d presents the results in the set-
ting where adversaries do not apply LDP. The plot shows that
this case actually boosts the attack and increases the backdoor
accuracy to almost 100% for any number of attackers. We dis-
cuss this observation further in Section 6. On the other hand,
utility is decreased. For instance, with 30 attackers, main task
utility is reduced from around 96% to around 76%.
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(a) No Defense (b) Norm Bounding
(c) Weak DP (d) LDP
(e) CDP
Figure 3: Setting 1 (Reproducing [93]): Main Task and Backdoor Accuracy with Various Defenses.
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(a) No Defense (b) Norm Bounding
(c) Weak DP (d) LDP on Non-Attackers
(e) LDP on All Participants (f) CDP
Figure 4: Setting 2 (Increasing Number of Attackers): Main Task and Backdoor Accuracy with Various Defenses.
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Then, in Fig. 4e, we report on the setting where LDP is ap-
plied on all participants, even if they are attackers. This mit-
igates the attack, but also decreases the main task accuracy.
For instance, with 30 attackers, backdoor accuracy is reduced
from 97% to 35% and main task accuracy from around 96%
to around 70%. Comparing to both norm bounding and weak
DP, it mitigates the attack better, but with worse utility.
CDP. Finally, we apply CDP. Fig. 4f shows that CDP overall
does mitigates the attack. For example, with 10 attackers, CDP
with  = 3 and δ = 10−5 decreases backdoor accuracy from
67% to 20%, while utility is reduced from 98% to 82%.
3.7 Take-Aways
Overall, we find that LDP and CDP can indeed mitigate
backdoor attacks, although, they do so with different robust-
ness vs utility trade-offs. Setting 1, which reproduces Sun et
al. [93]’s settings, demonstrates that backdoor attacks can be
quite effective even with one attacker in every round. Weak
DP and norm bounding mitigate the attack without really af-
fecting the utility. However, in Setting 2, with more attackers,
such defenses also decrease utility.
In both settings, LDP/CDP are more effective than norm
bounding and Weak DP in reducing backdoor accuracy, al-
though with varying levels of utility. Overall, CDP works
better as it better mitigates the attack and yields better util-
ity. However, as discussed in Section 6, CDP requires trust in
the central server.
Also note that using the same values for  in CDP and LDP
does not imply that they provide the same level of privacy, as
they capture different definitions. Hence, in the next section,
we set to empirically measure the privacy protection given by
DP by mounting actual inference attacks.
4 Defending against Inference Attacks
in FL
Next, we experiment with LDP and CDP against inference at-
tacks in FL. To do so, we focus on the white-box membership
inference attack proposed by Nasr et al. [70] and the property
inference attack presented by Melis et al. [67]. To the best of
our knowledge, these are the two state-of-the-art privacy at-
tacks in FL and are representative of unintended information
leakage from model updates.
4.1 Attacks
Nasr et al. [70]’s Membership Inference. The main intuition
is that each training data point affects the gradients of the loss
function in a recognizable way, i.e., the adversary can use the
Stochastic Gradient Descent algorithm (SGD) to extract infor-
mation from other participants’ data. More specifically, she
can perform gradient ascent on a target data point before up-
dating local parameters. If the point is part of a participant’s
set, SGD reacts by abruptly reducing the gradient, and this can
be recognized to successfully infer membership. Note that the
attacker can be either one of the participants or the server. An
adversarial participant can observe the aggregated model up-
dates and, by injecting adversarial model updates, can extract
information about the union of the training dataset of all other
participants. Whereas, the server can control the view of each
target participant on the aggregated model updates and extract
information from its dataset.
When the adversary is the server, Nasr et al. [70] use the
term global attacker and if she is one of the participants, lo-
cal attacker. Moreover, the attack can be either active or pas-
sive; in the former, the attacker influences the target model by
crafting malicious model updates, while, in the latter, she only
makes observations without affecting the learning process. For
the active attack, they implement three different types of at-
tacks involving the global attacker: 1) gradient ascent, 2) iso-
lating, and 3) isolating gradient ascent. The first attack con-
sists in applying the gradient ascent algorithm on a member
instance, which triggers the target model to minimize loss by
descending in the direction of its local model’s gradient for
that instance; whereas, for non members, the model does not
change its gradient since they do not affect the training loss
function. The second one is performed by the server by iso-
lating a target participant to create a local view of the training
process for it. This way, the target participant will not receive
the aggregated model and her local model will store more in-
formation about her training set. Finally, the third attack works
by applying the gradient ascent attack on the isolated partici-
pant. Overall, this is the most effective (active) attack from the
server side, and therefore we experiment with this one in our
analysis.
Melis et al. [67]’s Property Inference. Authors propose sev-
eral inference attacks in FL, allowing an attacker to infer train-
ing set membership as well as properties of other participants;
here we focus on the latter. The main intuition is that, at each
round, each participant’s contribution is based on a batch of
their local training data, so the attacker can infer properties
that characterize the target’ dataset. To do so, the adversary
needs some auxiliary (training) data, which is labeled with the
property she wants to infer.
In a passive attack, the attacker generates updates based on
data with and without the desired property, aiming to train a
binary batch-property classifier that determines whether or not
the updates are from data with the property or not. At each
round, the attacker calculates a set of gradients based on a
batch with the property and another set of gradients without the
property. Once enough labeled gradients have been collected,
she trains a batch property classifier, which, given gradients
in input, assesses the probability that a batch has the property.
In an active attack, the adversary uses multi-task learning, ex-
tending her local model with an augmented property classifier
connected to the last layer; this can be used to make the aggre-
gated model learn separate representations for the data with
and without the property.
4.2 Defenses
Overall, inference attacks in FL work because of the infor-
mation leaking from the aggregated model updates. Therefore,
one straightforward approach to mitigate the attacks is to re-
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duce the amount of information available to the adversary. For
instance, a possible option is to use dropout (a regularization
technique aimed to address overfitting in neural networks by
randomly deactivating activations between neurons), so that
the adversary might observe fewer gradients. Alternatively,
one could use gradient sampling [54, 88], i.e., only sharing a
fraction of their gradients. However, these approaches only
slightly reduce the effectiveness of inference attacks [67].
Prior work has investigated using differentially private ag-
gregation to thwart membership inference attacks [36, 69, 80,
108]. However, they are limited to the black-box setting, and
we are not aware of prior work using DP defenses in the con-
text of FL against the white-box attack in [70].
As for property inference, Melis et al. [67] argue that LDP
does not work against the attacks as it does not affect the prop-
erties of the records in a dataset. Nevertheless, in our LDP im-
plementation, participants perform DP-SGD [1] during train-
ing, so we do expect that it impacts the effectiveness of the
attack. On the other hand, CDP is supposed to defend against
the attacks as it provides participant-level DP; however, the re-
sulting utility might be highly dependent on the dataset, task,
and number of participants. However, [67] does not provide
any experimental results, limiting to report that models do not
converge for small numbers of participants.
In the rest of this section, we experiment with both LDP and
CDP mechanisms against inference attacks over a few experi-
mental settings.
4.3 Membership Inference
Dataset & Task. We perform experiments using two datasets:
CIFAR100 and Purchase100.3 The former contains 60,000 im-
ages, clustered into 100 classes based on the objects in the im-
ages. The latter includes the shopping records of several thou-
sand online customers; however, as done in [70], we use a sim-
pler version of this dataset which is taken from [89]. This con-
tains 600 different products, and each user has a record which
indicates if she has bought any of them. This smaller dataset
includes 197,324 data records, clustered into 100 classes based
on the similarity of the purchases.
The main task is to identify the class of each user’s pur-
chases. We follow [70] and, for Purchase100, we use a fully
connected model. However, for CIFAR100, we experiment
only with the Alexnet model.
Attack Setting. We follow the same FL settings as [70], set-
ting the number of participants to 4. The datasets are dis-
tributed equally between the participants. We also re-use the
Pytorch code provided by [70]. We measure attack accuracy
as the fraction of correct membership predictions for unknown
data points.
Unconstrained Attack. Table 1 reports the performance
of the membership inference attack in the settings discussed
above, with no deployed defenses. This shows that the global
attacker can perform a more effective attack compared to the
local one (e.g., 91% vs 75% accuracy on CIFAR100).
3See https://www.cs.toronto.edu/∼kriz/cifar.html and https://www.kaggle.
com/c/acquire-valued-shoppers-challenge/data
Dataset Global Attacker Local Attacker
Passive Active Passive Active
CIFAR100 84% 91% 73% 75%
Purchase100 71% 82% 65% 68%
Table 1: Performance of White-Box Membership Inference
Attack in [70] with No Defense.
Dataset No Defense LDP,  = 8.6 CDP,  = 5.8
CIFAR100 82% 68% 69%
Purchase100 84% 65% 70%
Table 2: Main Task Accuracy with No Defense, LDP, and
CDP.
LDP and CDP. Next, we experiment with DP. However, we
want to make sure we do so while providing reasonable utility
on the main task; thus, we first set to find a privacy budget
yielding acceptable utility, and then perform the attack in that
setting. Table 2 reports model accuracy in an FL setting with
4 participants. It shows that we get acceptable accuracies with
LDP and CDP with, respectively,  = 8.6 and  = 5.8 (δ =
10−5 in both cases). We then apply CDP (Algorithm 1) and
LDP (Algorithm 2), using these  values, and measure their
effectiveness against white-box membership inference attack.
We find that LDP does mitigate the attack, as reported in Ta-
ble 3. Even against the most powerful active attack (i.e., iso-
lating gradient), LDP decreases attack accuracy from around
91% to around 53% on the CIFAR100 dataset. In the local
passive attacker case, it decreases attack accuracy from around
68% to 54% in Purchase100.
Finally, in Table 4, we present the results when CDP is used
to defend against the attack. We assume that the server is
trusted in this setting, so we do not assess the global attacker
case. We find that CDP successfully defends against the at-
tack. For instance, against a passive local attacker, CDP re-
duces attack accuracy from around 73% to around 42% with
CIFAR100, and from around 68% to around 55% against an
active local attacker with Purchase100.
4.4 Property Inference Attack
Dataset. For property inference attacks, we use the Labeled
Faces In the Wild (LFW) dataset [43], as done in [67]. This
includes more than 13,000 images of faces for around 5,800
individuals with labels such as gender, race, age, hair color,
and eyewear, collected from the web. We use the same model
as [67], i.e., a convolutional neural network (CNN) with 3 spa-
tial convolution layers with 32, 64, and 128 filters and max
pooling layers with pooling size set to 2, followed by two fully
connected layers of size 256 and 2.
Attack Setting. We vary the number of participants from 5 up
to 30 and run our experiments for 300 rounds. Every partici-
pant trains the local model on their data for 10 epochs. Data is
split equally between participants. However, only the attacker
and target participants have the data with the property.
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Dataset Global Attacker Local Attacker
Passive Active Passive Active
CIFAR100 58% 53% 52% 55%
Purchase100 49% 62% 42% 54%
Table 3: Performance of White-Box Membership Inference
Attack in [70] using LDP ( = 8.6).
Dataset Local Attacker
Passive Active
CIFAR100 42% 48%
Purchase100 53% 55%
Table 4: Performance of White-Box Membership Inference
Attack in [70] with CDP ( = 5.8).
The main task is gender classification and the inference task
is over race. We measure the aggregated model accuracy with
and without DP. As done previously, we want to first find a
privacy budget that provides reasonable utility, and then apply
the attack. We use Area Under the Curve (AUC) to evaluate
the performance of attack, as done in [67].
LDP and CDP. Table 5 shows utility, with and without DP, in
terms of the accuracy of the main task. For LDP, setting  =
10.7 (δ = 10−5) does make the aggregated model converge,
unlike what suggested in [67]. On the other hand, for CDP, we
start from  = 4.7 (δ = 10−5) and increase it until we see the
model converges, which happens at  = 8.1. Table 6 report
the results of our experiments for both LDP and CDP with the
aforementioned  values.
Neither LDP nor CDP successfully defend against the at-
tack with these privacy budgets, as AUC does not significantly
change compared to running the attack without any defenses.
5 Related Work
In this section, we review previous work on attacks and de-
fenses in the context of robustness and privacy in ML and,
more closely, in FL.
5.1 Robustness
Poisoning attacks have been proposed in various settings,
e.g., autoregressive models [3], regression learning [46], fa-
cial recognition [102], support vector machines [7], collabora-
tive filtering [57], recommender systems [29], computer vision
models [17, 59], malware classifiers [16, 63, 86], spam filter-
ing [71], using transfer learning [104], etc.
In data poisoning attacks, the attacker replaces her local
dataset with one of her choice. Attacks can be targeted [7, 17]
or random [59]. Subpopulation attacks aim to increase the
error rate for a defined subpopulation of the data distribu-
tion [47]. Possible defenses include data sanitization [22], i.e.,
removing poisoned data, or using statistics that are robust to
small numbers of outliers [24, 91]. Also, [35] shows that poi-
soned data often trigger specific neurons in deep neural net-
works, which could be mitigated by removing activation units
#Participants Accuracy LDP CDP CDP
( = 10.7) ( = 4.7) ( = 8.1)
5 90% 83% 59% 85%
10 89% 81% 57% 83%
15 88% 80% 54% 82%
20 87% 78% 53% 79%
25 85% 70% 53% 77%
30 81% 68% 51% 73%
Table 5: Main Task (Gender Classification) Accuracy with No
Defense, LDP, and CDP.
#Participants AUC LDP CDP
( = 10.7) ( = 8.1)
5 0.97 0.95 0.94
10 0.87 0.86 0.85
15 0.76 0.75 0.76
20 0.70 0.70 0.68
25 0.54 0.52 0.50
30 0.48 0.47 0.45
Table 6: AUC of the Property Inference Attack in [67] with
No Defense, LDP, and CDP.
that are not active on non-poisoned data [58, 100]. However,
these defenses are not directly applicable in the FL setting;
overall, they require access to the raw data from each partici-
pant, which is not feasible in FL.
Model poisoning attacks rely on sending corrupted model
updates, and can also be either random or targeted. Byzan-
tine attacks [55] fall into the former category; an attacker
sends arbitrary outputs to disrupt a distributed system. These
can be applied in FL by attackers sending model updates
that cause the aggregated model to diverge [8]. As dis-
cussed earlier, attackers’ outputs can have similar distribu-
tions as benign participants, which makes them difficult to de-
tect [18, 107]. Suya et al. [94] use online convex optimiza-
tion, providing a lower bound on the number of poisonous
data points needed, while Hayes et al. [40] evaluate contam-
ination attacks in collaborative machine learning. Possible
defenses include Byzantine-resilient aggregation mechanisms,
e.g., Krum [8], median-based aggregators [18], or coordinate-
wise median [107]. These can also be used in FL, as discussed
in [79]; however, Fang et al. [28] demonstrate that they are
vulnerable to their new local model poisoning attacks, which
are formulated as optimization problems. Data shuffling and
redundancy can also be used as mitigation [15, 81], but, once
again, they would require access to participants’ data.
Backdoor attacks. In this paper, we focus on targeted model
update poisoning attacks, aka backdoor attacks [17, 35]. In the
context of FL, Bhagoji et al. [5] show that model poisoning are
more effective than data poisoning attacks. Then, Bagdasaryan
et al. [4] demonstrate the feasibility of a single-shot attack, i.e.,
even if a single attacker is selected in a single round it may be
enough to introduce a backdoor into the aggregated model.
Available defenses against backdoor attacks in non-FL set-
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tings [58, 100] investigate training data, which is not possible
in FL. Robust training processes based on randomized smooth-
ing are recently proposed in [101] and [98].
We have already discussed and reproduced defenses intro-
duced by Sun et al. [93], based on norm bounding and weak
DP. In our work, we also experiment with using CDP and LDP
to protect against both backdoor and inference attacks in FL.
For the former, we compare to defenses proposed in [93]; al-
though main task accuracy is higher using [93], CDP/LDP re-
duces attack accuracy further and additionally protects against
membership inference attacks.
5.2 Privacy
Essentially, attacks against privacy in ML involve an ad-
versary who, given some access to a model, tries to in-
fer some private information [23]. More specifically, the
adversary might infer: 1) information about the model, as
with model [45, 72, 95, 99] or functionality extraction at-
tacks [73, 75]; 2) class representatives, as in the case of model
inversion [30, 31]; 3) training inputs [11, 42, 90]; 4) presence
of target records in the training set [39, 60, 70, 85, 89, 97, 105];
or 5) attributes of the training set [32, 67]. In this paper, we
focus on the last two, namely, membership and property infer-
ence attacks.
Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs). MIAs against ML
models are first studied by Shokri et al. [89], who exploit dif-
ferences in the model’s response to inputs that were seen vs
not seen during training. They do so in a black-box setting,
by training “shadow models”; the intuition is that the model
ends up overfitting on training data. Salem et al. [85] relax a
few assumptions, including the need for multiple shadow mod-
els, while Truex et al. [97] extend to a more general setting
and show how MIAs are largely transferable. Then, Yeom et
al. [105, 106] show that, besides overfitting, the influence of
target attributes on model’s outputs also correlates with suc-
cessful attacks. Leino et al. [56] focus on white-box attacks
and leverage new insights on overfitting to improve attack ef-
fectiveness. Finally, MIAs against generative models are pre-
sented in [13, 39, 41]. As for defenses, Nasr et al. [69] train
centralized machine learning models with provable protections
against MIAs, while Jia et al. [51] explore addition of noise to
confidence score vectors predicted by classifiers.
In the context of Federated Learning (FL), MIAs are studied
in [70] and [67]. Nasr et al. [70] introduce passive and active
attacks during the training phase in a white-box setting, while
the main intuition in [67] is to exploit unintended leakage from
either embedding layers or gradients. In our experiments, we
replicate the former (see Section 4.1), aiming to evaluate the
real-world protection provided by CDP and LDP.
Property Inference. Ganju et al. [32] present attribute infer-
ence attacks against fully connected, relatively shallow neural
networks (i.e., not in an FL setting). They focus on the post-
training, white-box release of models trained on sensitive data,
and the properties inferred by the adversary may or may not be
correlated with the main task. Also, Zhang et al. [110] show
that an attacker in collaborative learning can infer the distribu-
tion of sensitive attributes in other parties’ datasets.
We have already discussed the work by Melis et al. [67],
who focus on inferring properties that are true of a subset of
the training inputs, but not of the class as a whole. Again, we
re-implement their attack to evaluate the effectiveness of CDP
and LDP in mitigating it. Put simply, when Bob’s photos are
used to train a gender classifier, can the attacker infer if people
in Bob’s photos wear glasses? Authors also show that the ad-
versary can even infer when a property appears/disappears in
the data during training; e.g., when a person shows up for the
first time in photos used to train a gender classifier.
DP in ML and FL. Differential Privacy (DP) has been used
extensively in the context of ML, e.g., for support vector ma-
chines [83], linear regression [109], and deep learning [1].
Some work focus on learning a model on training data and
then use the exponential or the Laplacian mechanisms to gen-
erate a noisy version of the model [12, 84]. Others apply these
mechanisms to output parameters at each iteration/step [49].
In deep learning, perturbation can happen at different stages
of the Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) algorithm; as dis-
cussed earlier, Abadi et al. [1] introduce the moments accoun-
tant technique to keep track of the privacy budget at each stage.
In our work, we focus on FL, a communication-efficient
and privacy-friendly approach to collaborative and distributed
training of ML models. Private distributed learning can also
be built from transfer learning, as in [74, 76]. The main intu-
ition is to train a student model by transferring, through noisy
aggregation, the knowledge of an ensemble of teachers trained
on the disjoint subsets of training data. Whereas, Shokri and
Shmatikov [88] use differentially private gradient updates.
Work in [33, 65] present differentially private approaches to
FL to add client-level protection by hiding participants’ con-
tributions during training. Whereas, in LDP, DP mechanisms
are applied at record level to hide the contribution of specific
records in a participant’s dataset. An LDP-based FL approach
is presented in [96] where participants can customize their pri-
vacy budget, while [78] uses it for spam classification. To the
best of our knowledge, our research is the first to experiment
with LDP and CDP against white-box membership inference
attacks in FL, and to demonstrate that both can be used as vi-
able defenses for backdoor attacks as well.
DP and poisoning attacks. Prior work has also discussed the
use of DP to provide robustness in ML, although not in FL as
done in this paper. Ma et al. [62] show that DP can be effective
when the adversary is only able to poison a small number of
items, while Jagielski et al. [48] experiment with DP-SGD [1]
against data poisoning attacks while assessing privacy guar-
antees it provides. However, they do not consider white-box
inference attacks or, more importantly, FL settings. Finally,
Cheu et al. [20] explore manipulation attacks in LDP and eval-
uate lower bounds on the degree of manipulation allowed by
local protocols for a variety of tasks.
6 Discussion & Conclusion
Attacks against Federated Learning (FL) techniques have
highlighted weaknesses in both robustness and privacy [53].
As for the former, we focused on backdoor attacks [4]; for
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the latter, on membership [70] and property inference [67] at-
tacks. To the best of our knowledge, prior work has only fo-
cused on protecting either robustness or privacy. Aiming to fill
this gap, our work was the first to investigate the use of Local
and Central Differential Privacy (LDP/CDP) to mitigate both
kinds of attacks. Our intuition was that CDP limits the infor-
mation learned about a specific participant, while LDP does so
for records in a participant’s dataset; in both case, this limits
the impact of poisonous data. Overall, our work introduced the
first analytical framework to empirically understand the effec-
tiveness of LDP and CDP on protecting FL, also vis-a`-vis the
utility they provide in real-world tasks.
LDP. Our experiments showed that LDP can successfully re-
duce the success of both backdoor and membership inference
attacks. For the former, LDP reduces attack accuracy further
than state-of-the-art techniques such as clipping the norm of
the gradient updates (“norm bounding”) and/or adding Gaus-
sian noise (“weak DP”) [93], although with a moderate cost in
terms of utility. For instance, as showed in Section 3.5, LDP
( = 3) mitigates the backdoor accuracy from 88% to almost
10% while the utility is reduced from 92% to 62%.
However, this only works against an adversary that is as-
sumed to be able to modify her model updates but not the al-
gorithm running on her device; to use Cryptography terminol-
ogy, this would be akin to a semi-honest adversary. Whereas,
if a fully malicious adversary does not add noise to her updates
(i.e., she “opts out” from the LDP protocol), this could actually
boost the accuracy of the backdoor attack. Our experiments in
Section 3.6 confirmed this was the case, as applying DP con-
strains the set of possible solutions in the optimization problem
during training on the participant’s dataset. That is, not apply-
ing DP means the optimization problem has a larger space of
solutions, and so any participant that does not apply DP can
potentially have a bigger impact on the aggregated model.
As for privacy, LDP is effective against membership infer-
ence – specifically, the white-box attack presented in [70] –
reducing the adversary’s accuracy without destroying utility.
For instance, as discussed in Section 4.3, LDP ( = 8.6) re-
duces the accuracy of a global active attack from 91% to 53%,
with utility going from 82% to 68%. However, LDP does not
protect against property inference [67]; this is not surprising
since LDP only provides record-level privacy.
CDP. CDP also provides a viable defense for backdoor and
membership inference attacks. In fact, CDP proved to be more
effective than LDP against the former. For instance, experi-
ments in Section 3.5 showed that CDP ( = 3) reduced back-
door accuracy from 88% to 6%, with utility only reduced from
90% to 86%. However, remind that we cannot directly com-
pare, in a purely analytical form, privacy guarantees provided
by LDP and CDP as they capture different concepts. Nonethe-
less, our experiments showed that we can obtain reasonable
accuracy on the main task with LDP and CDP, while further
reducing the performance of membership inference with the
former. For example, in Section 4.3, CDP ( = 5.8) reduces
local active attack accuracy from 75% to 48%, although utility
goes down from 82% to 69%. LDP ( = 8.6) reduces the accu-
racy of same attack from 75% to 55% while utility is reduced
from 82% to 68%.
Alas, we also found that CDP does not provide strong mit-
igations against property inference attacks in settings where
the number of participants is small. In other words, we can
only obtain privacy or utility. One might argue that FL appli-
cations like those deployed by Google [37, 103] or Apple [82]
are likely to involve a number of participants in the order of
thousands if not millions; however, it is becoming increasingly
popular to advocate for FL approaches in much “smaller” ap-
plications, e.g., for medical settings [10, 52, 87].
Moreover, CDP requires trust in the central server to cor-
rectly perform norm-clipping, aggregate clipped updates, and
add noise, as well as not to violate participants’ privacy ex-
ploiting their model updates.
Future work. As part of future work, we plan to investigate
the use of Trusted Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to
overcome some of the limitations discussed above in the con-
text of DP in FL.4 More specifically, TEEs could be leveraged
server-side to attest and verify the central server’s computa-
tions in the CDP setting. It could also be used, along with
homomorphic encryption, to hide participants’ updates by per-
forming the homomorphic decryption as well as the CDP al-
gorithm in a secure enclave. Moreover, TEEs could also be
deployed client-side to ensure that LDP is applied by all partic-
ipants, so that adversaries cannot opt out from applying noise.
Additionally, we plan to experiment with membership in-
ference attacks other than [70], and in particular with black-
box attacks on different datasets and models, including natural
language processing tasks. Overall, we are confident that our
framework can be re-used to experiment with LDP and CDP
along many more axes, such as different distributions of fea-
tures and samples, complexity of the main tasks, number of
participants, etc.
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